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A PROPHECY MISREAD THAT COULD HAVE BEEN:
REGULATORY ADJUDICATIONS AND A WEAKENING OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT IN LOGAN V.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The extent to which state administrative agencies afford environmental protections complicates the issue of environmental protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 Pennsylvania is one
of the many states to grant environmental protections under its
constitution.2 The legislature enacted the Environmental Rights
Amendment (ERA) amid growing concern about the state’s environmental resources after decades of degradation from the agriculture, mining, and lumber industries.3 This new amendment also
arose in a legal current which advocated for additional state constitutional protections for individual rights.4
This Note discusses the impact of Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF)5 in the Environmental
Hearing Board (EHB) adjudication of Logan v. Department of Environmental Protection (Logan) and its impact on future adjudications.6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PEDF articulated a new understanding of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights
Amendment (ERA)—a ruling environmental law scholars and practitioners lauded for giving more stringent protections to the envi1. James M. Lammendola, The Environmental Rights Amendment of Pennsylvania:
Pennsylvania’s Challenge To Act As A Trustee To Conserve And Maintain Its Public Resources. Can Other States Learn From The Pennsylvania Experience?, 47 REAL EST. L.J. 25,
66-67 (2018) (describing impact of EHB’s authority in interpreting ERA).
2. Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a
Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 181 (1993) detailing similar
environmental rights amendments across states).
3. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF), 161 A.3d 911, 917 (Pa.
2017) (detailing history of environmental degradation and developments leading
to ERA creation).
4. Margaret J. Fried & Monique J. Van Damme, Environmental Protection in a
Constitutional Setting, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1993) (describing Justice Brennan’s argument favoring states as protectors of individual rights).
5. 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017) (articulating new test for Environmental
Rights Amendment (ERA)).
6. 2018 WL 679381 2016-091-L at *24 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018)
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument after falling under older Payne ERA
understanding).

(269)
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ronment against industrial and agricultural interests.7 These
groups were also critical of the older test articulated in Payne v. Kassab,8 a three-pronged test for determining the constitutionality of
state actions prior to the ruling in PEDF.9
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) has statutorily-granted authority to issue permits to industrial and agricultural projects that have environmental impacts.10
The EHB is part of the judicial branch of government; it operates
under the principles of Pennsylvania administrative and environmental law and is the first tribunal to hear DEP actions.11 The EHB
has the power to hear disputes arising from DEP actions and provide relief to aggrieved parties by striking down agency actions.12
This authority gives the EHB significant influence in interpreting
legislation and constitutional provisions.13
This Note will argue that the praise afforded to PEDF for providing more stringent legal protections to environmental rights was
premature, as the ruling has left the DEP and EHB to fill in the
details of how to interpret the ERA.14 Given the DEP’s extensive
authority to issue permits and make regulations pursuant to the
ERA, the rigor of these protections is in question.15 While the EHB
and other courts have acknowledged that some DEP actions can be
7. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 928 (discussing rejection of older interpretations of
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA). For further discussion
of the history of Pennsylvania’s ERA and interpretation, see infra notes 160-180.
For commentary on the impact that PEDF was projected to have, see infra notes 7685 and accompanying text. While the impact was thought to be one of great significance for environmental protection and offer a new way for activists to protect the
environment through litigation, this Note argues that these pronouncements were
premature and did not consider the effect that regulatory adjudications can have
in weakening or forestalling the impact of PEDF. See infra notes 189-200.
8. 312 A.2d 86, 96 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (creating a three-pronged test for
determining unconstitutional environmental damage under ERA).
9. For further discussion of Payne’s three-pronged test, see infra notes 72-74.
10. 3 PA.C.S. § 505 (1) (2019) (listing DEP’s statutory grant of powers).
11. 35 PA.C.S. § 7514(a) (2019) (describing review process of EHB
adjudications).
12. § 7514(a-c) (detailing EHB’s statutorily granted jurisdiction to hear challenges arising from final DEP actions).
13. Zoey H. Lee, Standing up for a Cleaner Town: How the EHB’s Broad Definition
of Standing in Friends of Lackawanna v. Department of Environmental Protection Expands
Citizens’ Appellate Rights, 29 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 280-81 (2018) (explaining EHB’s
broad interpretative powers under Friends of Lackawanna). For further discussion of
the impact of Friends of Lackawanna and other EHB decisions, see infra notes 124128 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the lack of guidance in matters of state constitutional
interpretation, see infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of the EHB’s authority to issue permits, see infra
notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional under the ERA, the EHB has sparingly used this
power without setting a clear standard on how these actions qualify
as such.16 In practice, the courts do not have a method to make
this determination, leaving application of the ERA to an administrative agency.17 This Note will argue that those observers who heralded the resurrection of a once-forgotten amendment missed an
important piece of the puzzle: state administrative adjudications.18
This Note will frame the current state of the legal puzzle by
analyzing Logan as a bellwether case for the EHB’s interpretation of
the ERA’s protections.19 Part II will detail the relevant facts that led
to the adjudication in Logan.20 Part III will describe the history of
the ERA, its older interpretation in Payne, and its new interpretation in PEDF.21 Part III will discuss the relevant statutes and regulations directing the EHB and DEP and their interactions with
Pennsylvania environment law.22 Part IV will analyze the holding of
the EHB in Logan and examine its central holding in light of
PEDF.23 Finally, Part V of this Note will discuss the impact of Logan
and similar EHB holdings and their effect on the protections afforded by the ERA under Pennsylvania law.24
II. FACTS
In 2012, prior to the adjudication in Logan,25 Perdue Agribusiness filed for a permit with the Department of Environmental Pro16. See Thomas M. Duncan, EHB Upholds Plan Approval, Rejecting Challenge
Under Article I, Section 27, MGKF LITIGATION BLOG (Jan. 31, 2018), https://
www.mgkflitigationblog.com/Logan_Purdue_Air_Quality_Environmental_Rights_
Amendment (noting possibility of agency actions being statutorily compliant but
not constitutionally compliant).
17. See id. (illustrating EHB’s acknowledgement that not all agency actions are
compliant with ERA).
18. Id. (detailing role of administrative agencies in constitutional
interpretation).
19. For further discussion of Logan as an accurate state of the legal landscape,
see infra notes 110-128 and accompanying text.
20. For further elaboration on the facts of Logan, see infra notes 25-48 and
accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of the background of environmental litigation and
the Pennsylvania Constitution see infra notes 49-74.
22. For a further discussion on the corpus juris of Pennsylvania environmental law, see infra notes 75-128 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the holding of the EHB in Logan, see infra notes
110-128. For further discussion on the potential criticisms to the EHB’s decision,
see infra notes 168-202.
24. For a discussion of the impact that Logan will have, particularly on PEDF
and the ERA, see infra notes 203-217 and accompanying text.
25. Logan v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 2018 WL 679381 2016-091-L at *2-7 (Pa.
Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018) (delineating facts of case).
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tection (DEP) to operate a soybean processing plant in Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania.26 In the permit application, Perdue sought
permission to operate a facility that could process 1,500 tons of soybeans per day, or approximately 525,000 tons per year.27 Perdue
later revised this plan to increase the number of tons processed per
day to 1,750 tons, increasing the tons processed per year to
638,750.28 In 2016, the DEP approved Perdue’s revised permit.29
There are two ways to process raw soybeans.30 The first involves mechanically processing raw soybeans to process into other
materials.31 The second, referred to in the industry as “chemical
treating,” uses the chemical hexane in processing to achieve the
same result.32 The Federal Government has classified hexane as a
chemical with potential harmful environmental effects.33 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines fugitive emissions as
gases that “could not reasonably pass through a stack, chimney,
vent, or other functionally equivalent opening.”34 These gases are
released from industrial activity in an irregular fashion from unforeseen leaks, emissions, or other events.35 This was cause for concern for the appellants and used as part of the basis of their
challenge in this case.36
Using hexane to process soybean is standard industry practice,
and, globally, approximately ninety-eight percent of soybean
processing plants use this method.37 Perdue’s permit application
acknowledged that its Lancaster County plant would release hexane
gas.38 Perdue maintained that this emission would be in low quantities, still allowable under the statutory and constitutional
26. Id. at *2 (discussing Perdue’s soybean processing plant, which was projected to produce “soybean oil, soybean meal, and soybean hulls”) Id.
27. Id. at *2 (describing proposed output of soybean processing).
28. Id. at *4, (noting different permit applications).
29. Id. at *3 (noting amendments to original permit application).
30. Logan, 2018 WL 679381 at *3 (describing the procedures for soybean
processing)
31. Id. at *2 (describing two procedures for soybean processing and their environmental impacts).
32. Id. (affirming Perdue’s utilization of hexane processing).
33. Id. (noting environmental impacts from heating soybeans through its release of hexane gas).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2016) (stating EPA’s definition of fugitive air chemicals).
35. Id. (further defining fugitive air chemicals).
36. Logan, 2018 WL 679381 at *3 (describing appellants’ argument against
the permit because of hexane gas emissions).
37. Id. at *2 (noting heating procedures as standard industry practice).
38. Id. at *6 (noting Perdue’s acknowledged hexane emissions in its permit
application).
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schemes.39 While hexane gas is a pollutant under federal standards, small emissions are not known to be harmful to humans or
the environment.40 Some hexane emissions are inevitable in using
hexane to process soybeans.41 To achieve the same output under a
mechanical processing plant, Perdue would have needed a much
larger plant, which would have had a greater environmental impact
than a hexane plant.42 In accordance with the DEP’s permitting
requirements, Perdue held two sessions of public hearings on the
project.43 These types of hearings are meant to inform affected citizens and provide an opportunity for public comment.44 After attending the mandated hearings, two citizens, Annette Logan and
Patty Longnecker, sued to prevent the DEP from issuing the permit
to Perdue.45
This suit occurred after the second set of Perdue’s public hearings were held under the direction of the DEP.46 The first set of
public hearings was for the initial permit, in which Perdue planned
to process 1,500 tons of soybeans per day.47 Under this permit, the
hexane emitted from the plant would be less than the emissions
under Perdue’s second permit.48
III. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Environmental Rights Amendment
The DEP has statutory authority to issue permits under the Air
Pollution Control Act.49 This authority is not plenary and is subject
to legislative override.50 The two key restrictions on the DEP’s determinations are: (1) 25 Pa. Code § 123.1(a)(9), which prevents the
39. Id. at *6 (noting that emissions would be within acceptable range).
40. Id. at *5 (describing limited health and environmental impact of hexane
emissions in small quantities).
41. Logan, 2018 WL 679381 at *5 (acknowledging realities of limited hexane
emissions).
42. Id. at *9 (noting Perdue’s commitment to soybean heating processing).
43. Id. at *5 (noting statutory demands for public hearing and comment).
44. Id. at *1 (discussing purpose of public hearing requirements).
45. Id. at *10 (noting final actions of concerned citizens to prevent this
permit).
46. Logan, 2018 WL 679381 at *12 (describing timing of lawsuit in relation to
public hearing).
47. Id. at *5 (noting changes in permit application that required second public hearings).
48. Id. at *4 (noting differences in hexane emissions under (two different
permits).
49. 35 PA.C.S. § 4004 (2019) (mandating DEP comply with air pollution controls when issuing permits).
50. Logan, 2018 WL 679381 at *12 (noting statutory limitations of DEP).
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DEP from permitting air contaminants except when those contaminants are of minor significance; and (2) the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA), which protects each
citizen’s right to a clean environment.51 The DEP must act within
these requirements if its actions are to be considered legal.52
There has been significant upheaval in the scope of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s ERA.53 This upheaval occurred with a recent series of cases from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court placing
the amendment at the forefront of environmental litigation and
agency adjudication.54 Despite sweeping language in recent cases,
interpreting the ERA to be much stronger than in older cases
would suggest that the extent of the DEP’s authority in making regulatory determinations is ripe for possibilities given the broad scope
from these protections.55
Entrusting states with the ability to protect their citizens’ individual rights originates from Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence calling for less reliance on federal courts to defend individual rights.56
While legal scholars debate the influence of Justice Brennan’s idea
with respect to Pennsylvania’s ERA, its central thesis—that states
are better suited to protect individual rights than federal courts—
has led, in part, to the creation of Pennsylvania’s ERA.57 This surge
in using state constitutions to protect greater rights has led the
United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to provide authoritative, interpretive guidance on state constitu-

51. Id. (describing limitations on DEP’s permitting actions).
52. Id. at *11 (limiting range in which DEP actions are legal).
53. John C. Dernbach, The Abandonment and Restoration of Pennsylvania’s Constitutional Public Trust, ABA (Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing recent trend in application of
PEDF and its impact).
54. See Cusack supra note 2, at 184 (discussing implications of constitutional
interpretation of ERA and individual rights).
55. See Kenneth T. Kristl, The Devil is in the Details: Articulating Practical Principles for Implementing the Duties in Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, 28
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 589, 615-16 (2016) (discussing conflicting duties of agencies
between statutory and constitutional compliance).
56. See Fried & Van Damme, supra note 4, at 1370 (noting outcry for state
constitutional protections of individual rights).
57. John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it Protects the Environment: Part I—An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103
DICK. L. REV. 693, 712-13 (1999) (explaining role of Payne test in competing rights
and analyses).
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tional questions.58 Questions of environmental law arising in Pennsylvania essentially become constitutional questions.59
Pennsylvania adopted the ERA pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Constitution, Article Eleven, Section One.60 The ERA’s passage occurred during a period of growing political concern for environmental protections.61 The ERA reads:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.62
On the federal level, the Nixon administration’s passage of the Environmental Protection Act sparked a movement within states to
enact similar provisions.63 It was in this vein of environmental protection and Justice Brennan’s view of state protections of individual
rights that states enacted constitutional provisions similar to Pennsylvania’s to create and protect a11 citizens’ environmental rights.64
While other states have had differing interpretations of their ERA
(or equivalently named amendment), the Pennsylvania ERA afforded constitutional environmental protection and a grounds for
litigation to protect citizens’ environmental rights.65 This amendment advanced an understanding of the “environment” as a public
good that belonged collectively to Pennsylvania citizens, with the
Commonwealth holding it in trust.66 The second clause of the pro58. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991) (noting Pennsylvania Supreme Court as the final authority in interpreting Pennsylvania
Constitution).
59. See Fried & Van Demme, supra note 4, at 1381 (describing interplay between Pennsylvania’s ERA and environmental litigation).
60. PA. CONST. Art. XI § 1 (detailing amendment process through legislative
referral). Pennsylvania’s constitutional amendment procedure begins with legislative action. Id. It requires that a proposed amendment be voted upon in both
houses of the Pennsylvania legislature before being put to a referendum. Id.
61. Pa Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF), A.3d 911, 917 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973) (giving history of political forces that led to EPA passage).
62. PA. CONST. Art. I § 27 (providing full text of ERA).
63. Fried & Van Damme, supra note 4, at 1381-82 (describing rights protected
under ERA).
64. Id. at 1387 (detailing trust law understandings of ERA).
65. Id. at 1388 (describing interplay between Pennsylvania’s ERA and environmental litigation).
66. John C. Dernbach, James R. May & Kenneth T. Kristl, Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examination and Implications, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
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vision, which mandates that funds gained from the state’s allowance
of environmentally damaging activity would go into the corpus of
the public trust, reinforced this trust model.67
Passed in 1971, the ERA guarantees citizens the right to clean
air and water.68 Only since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in PEDF has the ERA gained significant traction as the basis for
challenging government actions that damage the environment—including government permitting.69 Before PEDF, the ERA was a
“forgotten amendment” of Pennsylvania’s Constitution in the sense
that legal scholars considered the amendment to be “self-executing.”70 Payne v. Kassab created a long-standing balancing test that
served as the only guidance issued by Pennsylvania Courts, and the
case offset environmental protections with the need for the state to
allow economic development.71 The three inquiries of the Payne
balancing test are as follows:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s public natural resources? (2) Does the record
demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the challenged
decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be
derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an
abuse of discretion?72
This test allowed the Commonwealth to issue permits for activity with potentially harmful environmental consequences so long as
the benefit from the project outweighed the environmental damage.73 Empirical evidence of ERA protections under Payne shows
1169, 1171 (2015) (explaining holding of Robinson in relation to ERA’s original
intention).
67. Richard Rinaldi, Dormant for Decades, the Environmental Rights Amendment of
Pennsylvania’s Constitution Recently Received a Spark of Life from Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth, 24 WIDENER L. J. 435, 447-48 (2015) (describing new holding of
PEDF and ERA).
68. Id. at 439-40 (describing original intention of ERA and subsequent
weakening).
69. Lammendola, supra note 1, at 28 (highlighting new understanding of ERA
in Robinson and PEDF).
70. Rinaldi, supra note 67, at 439-40 (describing legal history of ERA and subsequent Payne decision).
71. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 96 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (creating
three-prong balancing test for environmental litigation under ERA).
72. Id. at 94 (reiterating three-pronged test).
73. See id. (noting cost-benefit analysis inherent in all policy-making).
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that an “overwhelming majority” of individuals asserting their ERA
lost their claims.74
B. Pennsylvania Courts Interpreting and Applying the ERA:
Payne to PEDF.
The cases leading to the court’s creation of the Payne balancing
test provide some logic for the test’s creation.75 The core problem
that the court grappled with was how to determine what a clean
environment meant for the purposes of deciding which government actions to allow.76 The first major interpretative guidance on
the true meaning of the ERA was in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,77 where the court declared that the ERA
mandated the environment to be held in trust for the public, with
the government as a trustee.78 The dissent, written by Judge
Mencer, disagreed with the finding of a trustee/trustor relationship.79 Judge Mencer found the ERA to be nothing more than a
broad policy statement that offered no standing for individual litigants to sue.80 This meant the ERA, then, was a not self-executing
statute because it contained no method for enforcing individual
rights to a clean environment.81 Later, it was Judge Mencer who
would write the majority opinion in Payne.82
74. See John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental
Rights for Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335,
344 (2015) (reviewing application of ERA in reported cases and adjudications); see
also Lamendola, supra note 1, at 58 (discussing new applications of ERA after
Dernbach’s work).
75. See Cusak, supra note 2, at 184 (describing history of litigation leading to
Payne). Viewing the ERA as a self-executing provision gives it no special weight
when compared to the duties of government. Id. Offsetting this is the government’s responsibility to reasonably develop the land within its sovereign power.
76. Id. (noting dueling interpretations of ERA after its initial passage).
77. 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
78. Id. at 892 (attacking nebulous constitutional protections). Nebulous constitutional rights, in the eyes of Justice Rogers, writing for the majority, have been
under attack from courts because of their lack of detailed protections within their
constitutional language. Id. Justice Rogers rejects these judicial attacks on individual rights and asserts that the trustee/trustor relationship is sufficient to guarantee
the environmental rights of individual Pennsylvanians. Id.
79. Id. at 896 (weighing principles of constitutional interpretation in determining extent of their protections).
80. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (holding ERA
as self-executing and offering no standing).
81. Id. (considering lack of protections in constitutional text renders them
self-executing).
82. Cusack, supra note 2, at 193 (observing reversal of ERA protections from
Gettysburg to Payne).
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The logic underlying this test was a cost-benefit analysis:83 the
largely economic benefit against the revenue the state would generate that would go into the public trust, directly benefiting the Commonwealth’s people and supplanting any environmental damage
done.84 While the balancing test in Payne is facially neutral, not
necessarily favoring environmentally harmful development over environmental concerns, in practice it has been disproportionately
favorable to the former.85 This is in part due to the framing of the
balancing test itself.86 The benefits of a project in question are analyzed economically; its benefits are understood in growth, job creation, and financials.87 A static environmental preserve can only
offer an opportunity cost in comparison.88 This opportunity cost
that goes with environmental protection is difficult to overcome in
the balancing test.89 In applying this test, it becomes challenging to
give adequate weight to environmental concerns.90
This interpretation of the ERA was first seriously questioned by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2015.91 Robinson Township v.
83. Michelle Bryan Mudd, A ‘Constant and Difficult Task’: Making Local Land
Use Decisions in States with a Constitutional Right to A Healthful Environment, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 25-26 (2011) (describing impact of economic benefits in Payne
analysis).
84. Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46
DUKE L. J. 1169, 1181 (1997) (describing self-executing public trust in Pennsylvania environmental law under Payne).
85. See, e.g., Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF), A.3d 911, 93435 (Pa. 2017) (noting incorrect interpretations under Payne); see also Payne, 312
A.2d at 90 (describing three-pronged test for determining ERA compliance).
86. Rinaldi, supra note 67, at 442 (explaining reasoning of Payne). Quoting
the language of the Court in describing the balancing test, “[t]he Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania concluded that Article I, Section 27 required a ‘realistic and
not merely [a] legalistic’ test.” Id. (quoting Payne, 312 A.2d at 94).
87. Id. 442-43 (analyzing economic benefits in balancing test).
88. Mudd, supra note 90, at 25-26 (describing impact of economic benefits in
cost-benefit analyses). Embedded within the critique of Payne is that “the test is too
deferential to state agency regulations.” Id. This casts the DEP and other agencies
as the gatekeepers to the ERA and is the same critique that is levied by the subsequent holding in PEDF. See supra notes 75-109 and accompanying text.
89. Erin Daly & James R. May, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania: A Model for
Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 151, 158 (2014) (arguing incorrect applications of the ERA under Payne gave undue weight to this economic
analysis).
90. Mudd, supra note 90, at 51 (noting inadequacy of environment concerns
under Payne and similar balancing tests).
91. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957-58 (Pa. 2013)
(emphasizing trustee/trustor relationship in ERA). See also Meghan A. Farley, Did
the Court Dig too Deep: An Analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision in Robinson Twp., Washington County v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al, 26 VILL. ENVTL.
L. J. 325, 360 (2015) (noting majority’s opinion in Robinson implicated substantive
due process in revitalizing ERA protections).
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Commonwealth was the first blow to the Payne regime.92 In this case,
the court issued its first opinion that ran contrary to sections of
Payne; particularly, the state’s power to bar a subdivision’s ability to
protect its resident’s ERA rights.93 In Robinson the Pennsylvania
General Assembly pre-empted subdivisions from barring shale drilling in their assigned territories.94 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that this was a violation of a subdivision’s “implicitly
necessary authority to carry into effect its constitutional duties.”95
While this might not seem as severe of a rebuke to Payne, Robinson
has important implications for the trustee/trustor framework for
state environmental actions.96 In reframing the ERA as a duty for
subdivisions to enforce, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the trustee/trustor relationship.97 This reaffirmation reestablished the principle from the initial ratification of the ERA—the
environment is a public good that the state has been entrusted with
preserving.98
The second and final blow to the Payne regime was dealt by
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth
(PEDF),99 which signaled the end of Payne’s long-standing dominance in Pennsylvania environmental law.100 In PEDF, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly rejected Payne’s balancing test
and interpreted the amendment as granting each citizen a positive
right to environmental protection, a right the state cannot infringe
upon by allowing environmentally harmful projects.101 This end
was heralded by environmental activists and legal commentators,

92. Id. at 966 (noting new interpretation of Payne).
93. Dernbach, supra note 53, at 1180 (explaining Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s finding of ERA violation). See also Daly & May supra note 89, at 161-62
(arguing for more nuanced understanding of environmental trust under ERA).
94. Kristl, supra note 55, at 589 (applying trust law principles to Pennsylvania
environmental law).
95. Dernbach, supra note 53, at 1180 (summarizing plurality’s holding in
Robinson).
96. Id. at 1179 (noting impact that trustee/trustor relationship has on the
state’s role in environmental protection).
97. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957-58 (Pa. 2013) (recasting ERA as creating public-trust with state as trustor).
98. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 934 (imposing duty to “conserve and maintain” natural resources on Commonwealth); see also Kirsch, supra note 84, at 1181-82 (framing ERA as creating self-executing public trust framework for environmental
protection).
99. 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) (rejecting Payne’s balancing test).
100. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 930 (directly overruling Payne).
101. Id. at 934 (reiterating trust law principles to bind state action in protecting environmental rights).
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who saw it as the end of Pennsylvania’s neglect of its ERA.102 Many
viewed it as “breathing new life” into the amendment, reviving the
vision of Justice Brennan and others who saw states as the best protector of individual rights.103
The court in PEDF re-interpreted the ERA as directly protecting the environment, but it left out how this protection would occur.104 While the DEP is armed under the ERA with relevant
statutes, technical skills, and expertise to make such determinations, and has been tasked by the Pennsylvania state legislature with
doing so, the scope of its determinations has been challenged
under this new environmental regime.105 Specifically, commentators have questioned how the DEP’s authority is best understood in
the context of this new understanding of the ERA.106 While the
DEP has been granted the statutory authority to issue permits for
projects that would damage the environment, this authority’s extent is limited by the ERA.107 The key issue is whether the DEP’s
authority is co-terminus with a citizen’s rights under the ERA.108 In
other words, it is unclear whether the protections afforded to citizens under the ERA are at the DEP’s discretion, or whether some
actions of the DEP are outside the ERA’s protections and
unconstitutional.109

102. See Rinaldi, supra note 67, at 447 (claiming Robinson revitalized Pennsylvania’s ERA through reaffirmation of public trust).
103. Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 74, at 347 (2015) (noting new
weight of ERA under Robinson); see also Fried & Van Damme, supra note 4, at 1169
(framing Pennsylvania’s ERA as part of Justice Brennan’s calling for states to protect individual liberties).
104. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 939 (lacking suggestions for administrative
adjudications).
105. Duncan, supra note 16 (noting the role of the EHB in environmental
adjudications).
106. Caleb J. Holmes, Can the Environmental Rights Amendment Protect Pennsylvanians from EPA Cuts?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 8, 2018), https://
www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2018/03/08/can-environmental-rightsamendment-protect-pennsylvanians-from-epa-cuts/ (noting new protections afforded under PEDF considering recent EPA cuts).
107. Rebecca A. Cabrera, Trust the Process? The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
Broad Interpretation of the Environmental Rights Amendment Sent Shockwaves Through the
Commonwealth in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 29
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 256 (2018) (describing new ERA standards and impact on
government action).
108. See Duncan, supra note 16 (describing recent adjudications that weaken
ERA protections of citizens since PEDF).
109. See id. (illustrating problems with extent of ERA protections).
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C. EHB’s role in ERA Challenges
The EHB acts as Pennsylvania’s first tribunal of review for DEP
actions.110 Its jurisdiction is limited to final actions of the DEP.111
Unlike trial courts of general jurisdiction, the EHB has the technical expertise necessary to adjudicate complex cases of environmental law.112 While the EHB reviews cases de novo, there is an appeals
process for parties seeking a higher court to rule on their case.113
EHB adjudications are appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and then the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.114
The EHB has maintained the extent of the protections afforded by the ERA are not co-terminus with the authority of the
DEP.115 Practically speaking, the ERA affords the DEP a zone
where it can issue permits and decide whether to grant permits for
industrial projects which are potentially harmful, so long as the project does not go beyond the proscribed environmental harms in the
ERA.116 Under this framework, when the DEP issues a permit or
makes a regulation that would go beyond the zone allowed by the
ERA, a citizen can challenge these actions under the
amendment.117
Despite the EHB’s acknowledgement that the statutory authority of the DEP is not co-terminus with the ERA, challenging DEP
determinations is difficult in practice.118 The EHB and other
courts afford great deference to DEP determinations, as they lack

110. 35 PA.C.S. § 7514 (2019) (detailing review structure for final DEP
actions).
111. Id. (noting differences between agency and final actions).
112. See § 7513(a) (describing purposes of EHB’s creation).
113. See Logan v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 2016-091-L, 2018 WL 679381, at
*12 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018) (noting standard of review of EHB
actions).
114. § 7514 (noting Pennsylvania courts’ structure for review purposes).
115. Duncan, supra note 16 (noting EHB’s hesitation to define extent of protections afforded via ERA).
116. Id. (pointing to permissible zone of environmental degradation). The
ERA’s environmental protection is not absolute. Id. Permits for environmentally
harmful projects can still be granted. Id. There are actions of the DEP that are
unconstitutional under the ERA, but it is unclear on what grounds the EHB determines this. See infra notes 160-180 and accompanying text.
117. See 25 PA. CODE § 3.24 (2019) (providing Environmental Quality Board
Policy for processing public comments).
118. See Ctr. for Coalfield Justice v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 2018-028-R,
2018 WL 2081738, at *10 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Apr. 24, 2018) (distinguishing
between requirements mandated by regulatory and statutory compliance and
those mandated by ERA under previous rulings).
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the technical ability to make such determinations themselves.119 In
recent years, the EHB has decided several cases applying the ERA in
the context of DEP actions.120 While these key cases find the DEP is
not the sole delineator of the ERA, they do not offer a clear standard for how to determine when the DEP is acting in an unconstitutional manner.121 The most notable discussion of this standard is
Friends of Lackawanna v. Department of Environmental Protection (Lackawanna),122 where the EHB found the landfill approval process was
not performed in accordance with statute.123 In that case, the EHB
preserved its power to check other government branches for compliance with the ERA.124
Lackawanna is the exception rather than the rule, since the
EHB has used its preserved power sparingly to decide ERA compliance.125 Center for Coalfield Justice v. Department of Environmental Protection126 shows the EHB’s reluctance to issue guidance on how it
will determine the ERA compliance before it.127 Additionally, the
scope of protections the ERA affords is essentially in the hands of
the DEP and the EHB.128

119. See Thomas M. Duncan, EHB Finds Another Violation of PA’s Environmental
Rights Amendment, But Again, Only in the Presence of a Regulatory Violation, MGKF
LITIGATION BLOG (Nov. 22 2017), https://www.mgkflitigationblog.com/PA-Environmental-Rights-Permitting-Friends-Lackawanna (describing technical expertise
of EHB).
120. See Friends of Lackawanna v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 2015-063-L, 2016
WL 5001388 at *6-7 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sep. 2, 2016) (asserting EHB’s power
to apply ERA); see also Ctr. for Coalfield Justice, 2018 WL 2081738, at *11 (explaining ERA standards after Robinson).
121. Duncan, supra note 16 (asserting that best way to comply with ERA is
through statutory compliance, despite ERA’s reach). One can comply with all statutes and be found to be violating the ERA. See id. The safest way to ensure ERA
compliance is by statutory compliance. See id.
122. No. 2015-063-L, 2016 WL 5001388 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 2, 2016)
(discussing approval process for landfills).
123. Id. at *8 (finding lack of authority for permit).
124. Lee, supra note 13 at 262 (reciting Friends of Lackawanna’s holding).
125. See id. (noting petitioner’s unsuccessful claims before EHB).
126. 2018 WL 2081738, at *11 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Apr. 24, 2018) (finding
no success on merits in ERA challenge because environmental damage was not
sufficient).
127. See Duncan, supra note 119 (arguing EHB embraced nebulous standards
for determining ERA compliance).
128. See id. (noting lack of clarity between DEP actions and ERA protections).
If the extent of the DEP’s authority is co-terminus with the ERA, then the protections afforded to Pennsylvanians are governed by DEP actions. See id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
The EHB divided Logan into three main arguments.129 The
appellants argued that the alternatives analysis by Perdue and the
DEP were performed improperly, that the projected pollution was
underestimated and did not account for other sources, and that
granting the permit would violate the protections of the ERA.130
The EHB reviews cases de novo; it is not bound by any findings by
the DEP and is free to make its own factual findings pursuant to its
statutory purview.131 According to the EHB, a permit allowing an
industrial operation must comply with all statutes, regulations, and
case law, as well as be “in accordance with its duties and responsibilities under Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”132 The EHB also noted the appellants, Longnecker and
Logan, bore the burden of proving their claims in this adjudication
because they are third parties.133 The burden of proof on third
parties in challenging DEP actions stems from 25 Pa. Code § 121.122(c)(3).134 The EHB summarized the appellant’s arguments
as follows: (1) the DEP’s alternatives analysis was inadequate, (2)
the DEP’s fact-finding on fugitive emissions was in error, and (3) a
simple cost-benefit analysis would show that the environmental detriments would not be outweighed by the benefits of the Perdue
project.135
In challenging the DEP’s determination regarding the projected fugitive emissions under the proposed plan, the appellants
alleged the determination was not in compliance with 25 Pa. Code
§ 123.1(a)(9).136 This section of the Pennsylvania Code forbids
permitting a project that would release fugitive emissions that are
not of “minor significance.”137 In challenging this determination,
the appellants argued that the process by which the DEP classified
the projected emissions from the plant was inadequate to warrant
129. Logan v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 2016-091-L, 2018 WL 679381, at *11
(Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018) (describing arguments on appeal).
130. Id. (recasting petitioner’s claims).
131. Id. at *13 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018) (rejecting appellants’
claim).
132. Id. at *11 (noting grounds for determining validity of DEP’s actions).
133. Id. at *14 (describing third parties’ burden of proof).
134. Duncan, supra note 16 (reciting statutorily prescribed burden of proof).
135. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *15 (summarizing appellants’ arguments).
136. See id. (alleging permit was not issued in compliance with statutory
framework).
137. Id. at *16 (describing Pennsylvania Code’s demands for air pollution
assessment).
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the classification of minor significance.138 The appellants based
this argument on the failures of Perdue and the DEP to consider
their application with adequate attention to Pa. Code § 123.1.139
The only time this provision was considered by the DEP was in response to public comments that expressed concerns about the damage to air quality that would come from the site.140 In its brief, the
DEP gave two responsive arguments: (1) that the Pa. Code § 123.1
does not apply to fugitive emissions but rather applies to particulate
matter pollution, and (2) even if it does apply to fugitive air emissions, the DEP’s analysis of these emissions was appropriate under
this provision.141 The EHB refused to give a definitive interpretation of Pa. Code § 123.1 and concluded that the DEP’s analysis was
appropriate in its determination of the emission as one of minor
significance.142
The appellants’ second argument was based on the projected
pollution emitted from the plant.143 The appellants argued that
the projected emission of 100 tons of pollution per year, in the aggregate, should not be considered to be of minor significance.144
The EHB rejected this argument, using the projected environmental impact from the fugitive air emissions to make the determination of minor significance, not the amount of air pollution itself.145
In the aggregate, the EHB noted the context of the pollution finding that “Perdue’s fugitive emissions constitute[d] approximately
two percent of ozone precursor emissions from other nearby
sources.”146 With the EHB’s classification of the fugitive emissions
as being of minor significance was the health risk assessment.147
Both Perdue and the DEP conducted their own health assessments
of the proposed plant.148 The appellants challenged these assessments based on “the assumption of steady-state operations at Per138. Id. (noting appellants’ claim of inadequacies with DEP’s determination
of minor significance).
139. Id. (describing statutory scheme for issuing permits).
140. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *21 (describing public comments, which expressed concerns over hexane emissions and other harms).
141. Id. (noting DEP’s counter-arguments).
142. Id. at *20 (concluding appropriateness of DEP permit issuance).
143. Id. at *16 (explaining appellants’ argument for inadequate pollution
analysis).
144. Id. at *14 (aggregating projected pollution amounts on a per-annum
basis).
145. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *20 (rejecting arguments on projected aggregate pollution).
146. See id. at *14 (noting limited impact of Perdue’s projected air pollution).
147. Id. at *21 (describing impact of health-risk assessment).
148. Id. at *22 (describing competing health-risk assessments).
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due’s facilities.”149 This assumption would not account for any
additional emissions that would come from start-up and shut-down
procedures and events such as malfunctions and other mechanical
or technical failures.150 Therefore, the EHB rejected this argument, also noting the conservative projections from the DEP that
allowed for a margin of error, should these unforeseen events
occur.151
Alternatives analysis is required under PA. CODE
§ 127.205(5).152 This provision mandates that the appellant for the
permit perform a cost-benefit analysis of alternative “sites, sizes,
production process, and environmental control techniques, and
demonstrate that the benefits of a proposed facility significantly
outweigh the environmental and social costs.”153 In advancing this
argument, the appellants argued what the EHB referred to as a
“concoct[ion] [of] a litany of hypothetical harms.”154 These included harms that are far removed from the harms that would occur from the actual soybean production.155 One indirect harm
included Pennsylvania farmers growing more soybeans to meet increased demand and therefore causing a reduction in the amount
of corn that is grown.156 This would, in turn, mean more soybean
feed for livestock animals, and these soybeans could contain excess
hexane gas that would negatively affect the health of these animals.157 These tangential harms that are linked together through
various hypotheticals and conditions were rejected by the EHB, the
costs portion of the cost-benefits analysis to only include costs that
are directly foreseeable by the DEP or those directly brought to the
DEP’s attention through public comment.158
The EHB also reaffirmed in this case the principles of the alternatives analysis, which is to “reduce a facility’s emission footprint to
as low as practicable given the individual circumstances and objec149. Id. at *17 (detailing assumptions of steady-state production in health-risk
assessments).
150. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *18 (noting the inadequacies of steady-state
production assumptions).
151. Id. at *24 (rejecting appellants’ argument).
152. Id. at *21 (describing alternatives analysis required by DEP).
153. Id. (discussing the requirements of alternatives analysis). See 25 PA. CODE
§ 127.205(5) (detailing alternatives analysis test).
154. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *21 (noting hypothetical nature of appellants’ argument).
155. Id. (noting degree of separation between proposed plant and alleged
harms).
156. Id. (discussing petitioner’s claims for agricultural impacts).
157. Id. (noting health impacts of increased hexane in animal feed).
158. Id. (applying previous EHB rulings in limiting alternatives analysis).
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tives of the proposed project[.]”159 This type of analysis demands
an individual analysis for each project, not general rules that can be
applied abstractly to all projects.160 In the abstract, the EHB found
the appellants’ contention that the size of the Perdue project was
not given adequate consideration to be irrelevant to the alternatives
analysis.161
The shortest section of the EHB’s adjudication—and its most
consequential for environmental rights—is its refutation of the appellants’ contention that the DEP’s permitting violated Article I,
§ 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, otherwise known as the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA).162 The EHB considered the
appellants’ argument that the permit granting was unconstitutional
because it violated the Air Pollution Control Act and all applicable
regulations that arise under the Payne v. Kassab test.163 Payne created a three-part test for determining if the DEP’s actions violate
the ERA; the first part asks: “[w]as there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the
Commonwealth’s public natural resources?”164 Under the recent
holding of PEDF, the EHB rejected arguments predicated on the
assumption that DEP’s violation of applicable statues also violates
the ERA.165 The EHB concluded that because there were no additional arguments nor evidence showing how this action was violative
of the ERA, the action could not be considered unconstitutional.166
B. Critical Analysis
Although the first two issues are recitations of Pennsylvania environmental and administrative law, the third issue, regarding the
correct scope of the ERA under the new interpretation pronounced
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PEDF, is most vulnerable to
159. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *23 (outlining challenges of alternatives
analysis).
160. Id. at *24 (noting lack of abstract principals in alternatives analysis). The
point of the alternatives analysis is to propose individual alternatives for each project. Id. This type of analysis demands an individual assessment of each project,
not an abstract one. Id. The alternatives proposed are not the “lowest” possible
alternatives; they are the lowest alternatives for the specific project. Id.
161. Id. at *23 (noting irrelevance of appellants’ proposed alternatives
analysis).
162. Id. at *24 (rejecting appellants’ claim as arising under Payne test).
163. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (framing compliance with statutory requirements as part of Payne test).
164. Id. (explaining Payne’s understanding of ERA).
165. Logan, 2018 WL 679381, at *24 (rejecting Payne test considering PEDF).
166. Id. (finding DEP’s permit issuance constitutional).
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criticism.167 These critiques are twofold: PEDF was an explicit rejection of the old Payne regime and created fertile ground for litigants
to challenge state actions as being unconstitutional because of the
ERA’s own weight.168 Additionally, it has grave policy implications
for environmental litigation in the future.169
1. Standards for ERA Violations
After PEDF, there were many gaps to be filled by lower courts
regarding the exact contours of ERA protections.170 There is a gap
between constitutionality under the ERA and compliance with all
statutory and regulatory demands, compounded by the lack of guidance in the overlap between constitutionality and compliance.171
This opinion also notes the apparent emptiness of PEDF as a replacement for Payne insofar as the sole criterion for deciding constitutionality in statutory and regulatory compliance.172 If this is the
case, the importance of the ERA as offering its own environmental
protections aside from these regulations is moot.173 These criticisms, if followed to their end, lead to the conclusion that the ERA
under PEDF is only as effective as the EHB and DEP want it to be.174
The utility of the EHB’s recitation of the principles underlying
the DEP’s power to determine “minor significance” of emissions
and “alternatives analysis” is an important reiteration of basic principles of Pennsylvania administrative and environmental law.175
General principles of Pennsylvania administrative law give deference to agency decision making, like administrative law on the federal level.176 The EHB was created to be a specialized court with
167. Id. (isolating ERA interpretation as its own issue).
168. Id. (reciting history of environmental litigation and its impact on this
adjudication).
169. See Casey Murphy, When a Bright Line Rule Cannot be Found; Final Appealable Action of the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 227,
229 (2008) (describing previous impact of EHB adjudications without clear
precedents).
170. See Lammendola, supra note 1, at 70 (projecting ERA’s impact on future
environmental protection).
171. See Duncan, supra note 119 (noting challenges with environmental litigation appeals under vague standards).
172. Id. (analyzing EHB adjudications under mandates of ERA).
173. See id. (noting competing interpretations of ERA).
174. See Duncan, supra note 16 (criticizing hollowed ERA protections in
Logan)
175. See id. (noting traditional government’s technical inability to govern
effectively).
176. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 74, at 349 (2015) (noting deference to administrative agencies); see also Fried & Van Damme, supra note 4, at 1391
(noting role of administrative agencies in environmental protection).
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the competence to decide cases involving environmental and scientific components.177
This deference becomes important when decisions are within
the acceptable menu of options available to agencies under their
statutory grant of authority.178 Accordingly, the DEP’s ability to
competently and accurately label what level of emissions constitutes
emissions of minor significance as well as what factors determine
costs in alternative analysis are within the DEP’s statutory grant of
authority and purpose.179 At a certain point, challenging and demanding justification for agency actions and proposing additional
hypotheticals beyond what the DEP could reasonably contemplate
would take away that competency and would disallow the DEP from
fulfilling its intended legislative actions, such as issuing permits and
drafting rules and regulations.180 This need for agency functioning
must be tempered with the ERA, and cannot go so far as to allow
for the amendment to become hollowed by agency determinations.181 While there are the practical effects of allowing the DEP
to do their job, the holding of PEDF remains and must be applied
to ensure that Pennsylvanians can protect their environmental
rights and that the ERA does not become self-executing once
again.182 The importance of allowing agencies to do what they were
created to do becomes especially pronounced as the populace demands more specialized public goods from their governments,
which requires competency that only exists within agencies.183 The
legislature, a generalist body as a whole, lacks the competency and
capacity to promulgate rules and issue permits that take into ac177. 35 PA.C.S. § 7513(a) (2019) (noting EHB’s legislative purpose).
178. See PA. CODE 231.1(5) (2019) (understanding DEP’s role in government
functioning).
179. See generally Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 74, at 349-50 (explaining difficulties in winning ERAchallenges under EHB). To effectively govern in
the face of modern technical complexities, government needs technical expertise.
See id. Part of government’s response to this need is the creation of agencies that
can develop technical expertise and operate in their respective zones. See id.
180. See Cabrera, supra note 107 at 246 (respecting importance of judicial review while arguing for agency’s need to operate).
181. See Duncan, supra note 16 (expressing concern for administrative actions
and constitutional protections).
182. See id. (urging greater protections under EHB).
183. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (viewing
ERA as self-executing). If the ERA is self-executing, it is from the Court’s lack of
power to issue affirmative legislation that would protect the environment. See id. If
that is to be true, the Court enforcing this constitutional provision would be effectively making legislation. See id. Under this view, the court is powerless to enforce a
constitutional right, and therefore, its enforcement becomes a matter of policymaking. See id.
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count both the needs of industry and environmental impact.184
This failure of the legislature and the demands of the populace that
they represent led to the creation of the DEP and other agencies in
the first place—to fill in the law where legislature cannot do so.185
There is room for disagreement with the substantive determinations the DEP uses to decide what counts as an emission of minor
significance or when exactly the costs outweigh the benefits in an
alternatives analysis.186 Individuals affected might wish for a different result, but challenging that result for purely substantive reasons
does not warrant striking it down unless the substance is so egregious as to violate constitutional or statutory rights.187
2. Guidance from Higher Courts
The second point of criticism emphasizes the concern over
lack of guidance on the proper role that PEDF has in these adjudications.188 Pennsylvania is unique among states in preserving environmental rights for its citizens.189 If the ERA stands on its own to
protect the rights of Pennsylvanians to their environment, it must
supersede actions by state actors when their actions degrade the
environment.190 This is the logic behind the rejection of the Payne
test, particularly its first prong, which mandated compliance with all
applicable statutes and regulations.191
In practice, statutory compliance is still an important feature
for challenging DEP permits, despite this rejection.192 Non-compliance with the statutes and regulations is enough to win an adjudication, but compliance with statutes and regulations is not itself
184. Id. at 206 (pointing to lack of expertise in legislatures).
185. Logan v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 2018 WL 679381 2016-091-L at *24 (Pa.
Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018) (acknowledging purpose of DEP).
186. Duncan, supra note 119 (describing conflicting views of Robinson and
PEDF and its constitutional framework). This is not the first time that courts and
commentators have grappled with the correct analysis of what counts for determining what is enough for constitutional protections. See Cusack, supra note 2, at 19293 (discussing conflicting cases interpreting ERA). These precedents strike at the
very heart of how the ERA is affected through government powers. Id.
187. 25 PA. CODE § 535.1 (2019) (listing DEP’s powers to issue permits).
188. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
189. See Fried & Van Damme, supra note 4, at 1387 (noting constitutional
provisions protecting environmental rights).
190. See Kristl, supra note 55, at 624-25 (applying constitutional law principles
to ERA).
191. See Duncan, supra note 16 (explaining rejection of Payne considering
PEDF).
192. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF), 161 A.3d 911, 927
(Pa. 2017) (noting importance of statutory compliance).
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enough to show compliance with the ERA.193 This stems from the
new model of environmental law imposed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PEDF.194 The Commonwealth has a duty to protect
the environment as a trust and ensure its actions are not presumed
to be in furtherance of that trust.195 Therefore, there exists a theoretical plane where state action is not constitutional regarding environmental protection, but the feasibility of challenging state action
in courts along this plane of unconstitutionality has remained
unclear.196
The problem of statutory compliance and constitutionality is
compounded by the lack of guidance on how to accurately gauge
when state actions are violative of the trust imposed by the ERA and
are therefore unconstitutional.197 This lack of guidance is especially frustrating when the EHB rejects appellants’ arguments that
they have not violated the ERA because they have complied with all
relevant statutes and regulations, and there is no other evidence to
show a violation of the ERA.198 The concern is what evidence
would be sufficient to show an ERA violation.199 Without this guidance, PEDF becomes Payne by another name, as the only effective
way to win an adjudication is to show statutory and regulatory noncompliance.200 This case is not the first adjudication where the
EHB refused give a definitive answer on the determination of an
ERA violation, and given this trend, the EHB is unlikely to give one
in the future.201 Until such a case is decided, any grand pro193. See id. (discussing co-terminity between statutes and ERA).
194. See id. at 932-33 (explaining new ERA interpretation); see also Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 956-58 (Pa. 2013) (establishing trust
framework for environmental protection).
195. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932 (explaining practical effects of trust framework
from Robinson Township).
196. See Logan v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 2016-091-L, 2018 WL 679381, at
*25 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jan. 29, 2018) (rejecting co-terminus extent between
ERA and DEP’s grant of statutory authority).
197. See Duncan, supra note 16 (noting lack of guidance on extent of ERA
protections).
198. See id. (pointing to lack of clarity on extent of ERA’s protection considering PEDF).
199. See id. (noting lack of enough clarity for showing ERA violations).
200. See Duncan, supra note 119 (noting EHB has tackled issue of ERA’s protection in conjunction with DEP permitting procedures); see also Kristl, supra note
55, at 622 (noting role of statutory compliance with constitutional compliance).
Kristl’s argument pre-dates the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Ruling in PEDF and
applied the reasoning from Robinson Township. See id. Despite this, his reasoning is
prescient and foresees the problems that Pennsylvania courts currently face regarding the ERA’s protections. See id.
201. See Duncan, supra note 16 (noting other EHB adjudications that weakened ERA protections). See also Ctr. for Coalfield Justice v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
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nouncements of the ERA’s new bite are largely premature, and its
expanded protections exist in name only.202
V. IMPACT
Logan’s impact is twofold: First, it weakens the new protections
under the ERA, as expressed in PEDF.203 Second, in giving deference to agency decisions and presuming that they are constitutional, the ruling limits the potential successes of citizen-initiated
challenges under the ERA.204 These impacts, and the existence of
the shadowy area where an agency’s decision can be considered violative of the ERA, cry out for resolution in subsequent decisions.205
The EHB has acknowledged the potential for a regulatory
body’s decision to be violative of the ERA and therefore invalid, but
it has issued little guidance on how this phenomenon can manifest
itself, and courts have been silent on such issues arising on appeal.206 Relying on agency decisions to determine the scope of the
ERA essentially is meaningless.207 If the point of the ERA, as stated
under PEDF, is to ensure Pennsylvanians’ access to clean air and
water, then that right is outside the scope of debate and state action.208 There would be reasonable restrictions on the right, but a
Nos. 2014-072-B, 2014,083-B, 2015-051-B, 2017 WL 3842580, at *37 (Pa. Envtl.
Hearing Bd. Aug. 15, 2017) (finding DEP permits violated ERA). The EHB found
a government action to be in violation of the ERA because the environmental
harm was egregious, and the DEP failed to take appropriate steps to perform an
alternatives analysis to mitigate potential environmental harms. See id. Despite
this, after the DEP performed the alternatives analysis, the EHB found no ERA
violation. See Ctr. for Coalfield Justice v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 2018-028-R,
2018 WL 2081738, at *11 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Apr. 24, 2018) (finding grouting
in stream flow not covered under ERA); see also Friends of Lackawanna v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., No. 2015-063-L, 2016 WL 5001388, at *7 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept.
2, 2016) (asserting EHB’s ability to determine ERA compliance).
202. See Lackawanna, 2016 WL 5001388, at *8 (noting similar standard in all
ERA cases).
203. See Duncan, supra note 16 (locating Logan in series of EHB cases).
204. See id. (pointing to challenges future environmental activist litigants will
face).
205. For further discussion of the ambiguity regarding Payne jurisprudence,
see supra notes 189-196 and accompanying text.
206. See Cabrera, supra note 107, at 256-57 (pointing to holes in PEDF).
207. See Fried & Van Damme, supra note 4, at 1369, 1400 (noting outcry for
state constitutional protections of individual rights). The initial call for such protections occurred in a more general sense. See id. Justice Brennan urged states to
be the main protector of individual liberties as states can set a higher floor for
individual rights, a floor the federal government cannot lower under the U.S. Constitution. See id.
208. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 939 (2017)
(concluding that Commonwealth is not “proprietor” of resources).
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state agency’s interpretation of the right is not the only valid
interpretation.209
In the ERA’s present interpretation, the determination of the
limits of the right is made solely by the administrative agency that
regulates such activities.210 Due to the recent trends in this field,
there is a lack of case law that can guide administrative adjudications; therefore, the extent of the right exists within agency determinations.211 It is a right that exists insofar as the government
agency allows it to exist, but when the DEP does not continue to
allow this right to exist, the ERA becomes self-executing once
again.212
This essentially leaves the law, in the EHB’s own words, like the
decades-long regime that came before it.213 This change is premature because of a lack of clear guidance even though PEDF was
thought to be a new era for the ERA and environmental rights.214
The extent to which the ERA protects the environmental rights of
all Pennsylvanians under PEDF is in flux.215 Despite the EHB’s admittance that some actions of the DEP are theoretically outside the
scope of the ERA, there has yet to be an adjudication that points to
how one can determine the constitutional validity of certain actions.216 The lack of a clear judicial test of constitutionality for DEP
actions under the ERA render the agency’s actions de facto consti-

209. See Cabrera, supra note 107, at 256 (predicting role of lower courts filling
gaps from PEDF).
210. See Friends of Lackawanna v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 2015-063-L, 2016
WL 5001388, at *8 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 2, 2016) (asserting EHB’s ability
to interpret ERA as part of government function).
211. See Duncan, supra note 16 (re-iterating EHB’s ability to decide ERA violations without statutory violations).
212. See Dernback & Propachek, supra note 74, at 344-45 (criticizing older
ERA framework in Payne); see also Murphy, supra note 169, at 230 (arguing importance of EHB decisions).
213. See Lackawanna, 2016 WL 5001388, at *8 (asserting EHB’s fuzzy standard
is precedent for ERA).
214. See Duncan, supra note 119 (explaining Lackawanna and EHB’s ERA
application).
215. For further discussion on this flux, see supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
216. For further discussion on ERA litigation and its protections, see supra
notes 75-128 and accompanying text.
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tutional interpretations, such that the extent of protections given by
the ERA must fall in line with the DEP’s determinations.217
Alexander N. Palmer*
217. For further discussion on the unclear standards in determining an ERA
violation, see supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law, Villanova School of Business; B.A., Political Science and History, 2017, University of Pennsylvania.
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